



I show that the indeterminacy problem is in fact far more problematic than even the
harshest critic of structuralism has realised; it is not a bullet which can be bitten by struc-
turalists as previously thought; it proves that pure computational structuralism is un-
tenable and finally it establishes a new adequacy condition for all hybrid structuralist
theories which I show to be in direct tension with the theoretical requirement of multi-
ple realisability across different mediums.
§1. When it comes to providing a satisfactory account of physical computation, three
main adequacy conditions emerge from the literature. The first andmost classic is the
avoidance of triviality, i.e., ensuring one’s theory does not entail that every physical system
implements every computation.1 The second adequacy condition is that computational ex-
planation is medium independent, i.e., that an account of physical computation can capture
the fact that computational systems are built with distinctmaterials and specifications.2 The
third most recent condition – primarily aimed against computational structuralism – is to
ensure the determinacy of a truth-functional implementation, i.e., that an account can tell
us when a physical system is computing, e.g., AND rather than OR.3
In this short note I want to show that failing to meet this third adequacy condition is
far more problematic that has been recognised and has the potential to lead to a reductio ad
absurdum. This reveals that ensuring the determinacy of a truth-functional implementation
is the most important of the three adequacy conditions, since failing to meet the others –
though objectionable – does not entail absurdity: as with pancomputionalists who deny the
first (e.g. (Scheutz 2001); and structuralists who reject the second (e.g Dewhurst [2018]).
I’ll first argue that for pure computational structuralism a reductio can be established
by means of a simple mathematical proof (§3-5). I’ll then survey the prospects of modern
‘hybrid’ accounts of computational structuralism and conclude that, at best, the threat of
the reductio pushes them to foreclose on satisfying the second adequacy condition for an
account of computation, namely, medium independence (§6-8).
1Note this is the weakest version of the triviality condition, it can be strengthened to ensure an adequate theory
should not entail that every physical system implements some computation, i.e., the theory should place suitable
restraints on the simple mapping account. The worry here is that a trivial account of physical computation will be
useless for the purposes of computer science or cognitive science since it only vacuously explains why computing
devices/the mind are computational. See Putnam 1988; Searle 1992; Sprevak 2018; Schweizer 2019.
2This can be understood as a species of Putnam’smultiple realisability thesis in the philosophy ofmind; a single
computational state can be realised by many distinct physical systems (provided the system’s physical properties
can support the state-transition rules, etc.). See Putnam (1967); Haimovici (2013); Shapiro (2000).
3The threat of indeterminacywill similarly arise for all structural dual pairs. See Shagrir [2012]; Sprevak [2010];
Bishop (2009); Dewhurst [2018]; Lee [2018].
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§2. The third adequacy condition, which I shall call the determinacy condition, was first
raised by Shagrir [2001, 2012] as an objection to structuralist accounts of physical com-
putation –which broadly hold that physical computation is determined by the causal/ func-
tional/mechanistic structure of the physical system.4 The simplest version of the objection,
due to Sprevak [2010], is given by the ‘duality’ of basic Boolean gates. That is to say, the
fact that pairs of two-input, single-output gates such as AND/OR are invertible, such that,
appeal to their structural features alone cannot hope to determine whether a given physical
component is an AND-gate or an OR-gate. For an illustration of this, Sprevak gives a simple
gate which is sensitive to voltage ranges LOW (0–5v) or HIGH (>5v):5





Table 1: Gate 1
Blatantly, Gate 1 could be used to compute either AND or OR because the assignment
of the voltage ranges 0–5v/>5v to truth values T/F must be arbitrary if our only recourse is to
the structural features of the physical system. This indeterminacy is not restricted to AND/OR;
it generalises to any structural dual pair of two-input single-output Boolean gates across dif-
ferent physicalmediums (e.g. electric, hydraulic). For example, NAND/NOR,XOR/XNOR.6
Note that on the main alternative view to structuralism, namely, semanticism, this in-
determinacy will be resolved by the additional representational content which semanticists
characteristically appeal to beyond the merely structural features of the physical system.7
Thus Gate 1 can be said to implement AND if the voltage range 0–5v represents 0/F. In this
way the objection works in favour of semanticists against the structuralist.
For their part, most structuralists – such as Dewhurst [2018]; Mollo [2018]; Miłkowski
and Fresco [2019]; Lee [2018] – opt to bite the bullet with respect to this indeterminacy and
accept the underdetermination of physical computation as a fact of structuralist life. After
all, they can still maintain there is some (non-bijective)mapping between the formal and the
physical. Even a surjective non-injective mapping would guarantee that Gate 1 is mapped
to a logical function, just not uniquely. Thus the structuralist need not forgo the possibility
of computational analysis when conceding to the semanticist that certain truth-functions
are systemically underdetermined by structuralist resources.
Inwhat follows Iwill argue this indeterminacy is caused by amore fundamental indeter-
minacy and is far more problematic than either semanticists or structuralists have realised,
since it commits structuralists to fatally absurd – and not merely indeterministic – results.
In particular, the equivocation of the two digits of binary computational 0/1.
4See Egan [1992]; Egan [1994]; Egan [1995]; Chalmers [1996]; Miłkowski [2013]; Fresco [2015]; Piccinini [2007]
& Piccinini [2015].
5I slightly adapt Sprevak’s original example [Sprevak, 2010, 296].
6See: Shagrir [2001]; Miłkowski and Fresco [2019, 2].
7Classic semantic accounts include: Dennett [1971]; Churchland [1986]; Fodor [1998]; Searle [1992]; Crane
[2003]; Bishop [2009]; Shagrir [2001]; Shagrir [2012]; Shagrir [2018]; Sprevak [2010]; Rescorla [2013] & Rescorla
[2014].
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§3. Beforewe go further I must draw an important distinction between ‘pure’ structuralist
accounts which appeal only to the structural features of the causal system, such as
can be found in Chalmers [1996], Dewhurst [2018] and Schweizer [2019], and ‘hybrid’
structuralist accounts which rely on an appeal to non-structural features such as proper
functions, mechanisms or telofunctions, such as Piccinini [2015] Mollo [2018]; Miłkowski
[2013]; Fresco [2015]. This distinction is important because although the reductio can be
raised against both species of structuralist accounts, they require a separate treatment, for
reasons that will become clear. Henceforth, until §6, my focus will be exclusively on pure
structuralist accounts for which the application of the reductio is the most vivid and even
admits of a formal proof.
My first conjecture is that if there is indeterminacy with respect to the computational
truth-functions, then there is an (intractable) indeterminacy with respect to the computa-
tional digits 0/1. The term digit here needs defined due to lack of terminological consensus:
By digit Imean themost fundamental computational individuals given by a physical system
under a formal interpretation. Much of the logical properties of truth-values and the phys-
ical properties of the physical states are irrelevant to the digits, all that matters is the causal
structure of a physical process under a formal mapping. Therefore I distinguish truth-values
(T/F), from computational digits (0/1), from physical states (e.g. 0V/5V). We can now say
that under pure computational structuralism, the identities of the digits are exhausted by
their structural profiles.8
To set out the indeterminacy between the computational digits, we return to Gate 1
(Table 1). Consider the following, if the digits 0/1 in Gate 1 were determinate then the
truth-functions could not be indeterminate, e.g., if we assigned LOW to F, Gate 1 would im-
plement AND. Contrapositively, if there is indeterminacy in the truth-functions then there
cannot be determinacy in the digits. Therefore, the indeterminacy of AND/OR issues from
the underlying indeterminacy of 0/1. And indeed it seems no structural features of the volt-
age ranges 0–5v/>5v could determine which range should be assigned T/F. This will be the
case for all problematically structurally invertible duals because the key point here is that
computational truth-functions are truth-functional, i.e., they are defined by their truth tables
such that their values are a function of their digit input.
Structuralists who accept the indeterminacy of the truth-functions will be unmoved by
the indeterminacy of the digits and ask why they cannot simply adopt a many-one relation-
ship between the logical values and physical states. My next conjecture answers why not:
if the computational digits are indeterminate, then they are structurally identical. The re-
sult that the structural profiles of the computational digits are identical, rather than merely
invertible commits the structuralist to the claim there is only one computational digit – an
absurdity so great it must forfeit the very legitimacy of the account, undermining, as it does,
any coherent conception of binary computation.
Structural identity is standardly established by demonstrating that some element or
function can be permuted while the structure of the domain, or system, is preserved.9 As
such, one only need reflect on the fact that the voltage ranges the computational digits rep-
resent can be swapped without change to the computational system to see that the digits
are structurally identical and hence, for a pure structuralist, identical. Given that this point
threatens to draw from pure structuralism a consequence absurd enough to refute it, this
8Note that even a reductionist/eliminativist approach to the digits will require an adequate account of their
computational individuation.
9SeeKorbmacher and Schiemer [2018] for an in depth discussion of structural properties and the corresponding
formal means of establishing structural identity.
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result merits proof, which will be the work of §4.
§4. To prove structural identity mathematically we standardly define a structure preserv-
ing permutation, i.e., a non-trivial automorphism. In the case of physical computa-
tional we can define a gate in a given computational system which (determinately) com-
putes a truth-function that permutes the digits, i.e., an implementation of a non-trivial au-
tomorphism.10
Given a simple computational system with three logical connectives (NOT, AND, OR)
we can define the automorphism with the following gate, where HIGH/LOW represents




Table 2: Gate 2
Let S be the two-membered set of physical states including the discrete voltage ranges
(e.g. S = {0–5v, >5v}). The function f implemented by Gate 2 can then be defined:
f : S → S given by f(x) = ¬x, x ∈ S.
Let us now prove that f is a non-trivial automorphism: Since f is not the identity function
f(x) = x, f is non-trivial. A function is an automorphism if it is an isomorphismwhichmaps
the set S to itself. A function is an isomorphism if it is a bijection and a homomorphism. A
function is a bijection if it maps to every element in the set uniquely, i.e. it is surjective and
injective. It is straightforward to prove that f is a bijection by the fact that the function sim-
ply swaps HIGH and LOW by replacing each (surjective) exactly with the other (injective).
However, f is less obviously homomorphic. A function is a homomorphism if it is a structure
preserving mapping, i.e. a function h such that for the sets G, H under operations (G,∼)
and (H, ∗), x, y ∈ G,
h : G→ H : h(x ∼ y) = h(x) ∗ h(y).
Since we are establishing an automorphism we need to show that for (S,∼) and (S, ∗):
f : S → S : f(x ∼ y) = f(x) ∗ f(y)
for each of the operations defined on S, i.e. NOT, AND, OR.
It is straightforward to show that f(¬x) = ¬f(x). Substituting f(x) = ¬x gives:
¬(¬x) = ¬f(x)
¬¬x = ¬(¬x)
Next, although f(x ∧ y) 6= f(x) ∧ f(y), we can prove
f(x ∧ y) = f(x) ∨ f(y)
f(x ∨ y) = f(x) ∧ f(y)
10It might be helpful here to recall that the structuralist’s rejection of the determinacy condition in favour of e.g.
a surjective non-injective mapping, is entirely compatible with that mapping uniquely determining some (but not
all) truth-functions.
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by De Morgan’s Laws since substituting f(x) = ¬x gives
¬(x ∧ y) = ¬x ∨ ¬y
¬(x ∨ y) = ¬x ∧ ¬y.
Revealingly, this latter part of the proof – i.e., that the operations OR/AND preserve each
others structure across an automorphic mapping – is a mathematical way of formulating
the original indeterminacy objection as raised by Sprevak.
Since f is a bijection and homomorphism, f is an isomorphism. Since f is an isomor-
phism which maps S to itself and not merely the identity mapping, the function imple-
mented by Gate 2 is a non-trivial automorphism, as conjectured. The significance of this
result is that it serves as a formal articulation and proof of the conjecture that the compu-
tational digits 0/1 have an identical structural profile. It works by precisfying sameness of
structure mathematically using some of the basic tools of group theory. Importantly, since
we chose the set S arbitrarily, the result applies to all binary sets of physical states imple-
menting computational digits, without loss of generality.
It is no coincidence that a growing number of opponents of mathematical structuralism
have defined automorphisms in precisely this way to establish precisely the same thing
about various mathematical objects – namely – that they are problematically structurally
identical. Such proofs issue from disparate fields of mathematics ranging from complex
analysis; group theory; and even Euclidean space.11 Some of the most problematic cases
define automorphisms between two unlabelled nodes in a graph.12 However, the classical
example is given by defining an automorphism between a + bi and a − bi on the complex
field; i.e., the function f: (C)→ (C) given by f (x) = −x, ∀x ∈ C.13
This presents uswith an interesting corollary: the indeterminacy problem for pure com-
putational structuralism is, at its root, caused by the very same indiscernibility problemwell
known tomathematical structuralists: Both species of structuralismmust answer to fact that
the provable structural identity of their individuals forces them to count those individuals
as identical, which is false.
§5. A system over which one can define an automorphism is known as a non-rigid sys-
tem. A natural thought is that pure structuralists can somehow defend themselves by
pointing out that since AND/OR preserve each other’s operations, we can block the defini-
tion of an automorphism by adding only one of them to a computational system. It is true
this would make the system rigid. Even a systemwith both AND and OR can bemade rigid
by extending it to include any connectivewhose structural inverse is not in the extension, for
example, NANDwithout NOR. A structuralist may protest that the system S I have proven
to be non-rigid is conveniently gerrymandered, containing – as it does – structural inverses
which make it possible to define a structure preserving function. The dice was loaded, so
to speak, in the initial selection of a fully dual computational system.
The undeniable existence of rigid systems, however, can do nothing to detract from my
argument. For, it is not in the structuralists power to demand that only rigid systems are com-
putational systems without a non ad hoc argument to this effect. Pending such an argument,
11See: Burgess [1999]; Shapiro [2008, 2006, 2012]; MacBride [2006]; Button [2006]; and Ladyman [2005].
12Leitgeb and Ladyman [2008, 390–93]
13Computational structuralism and mathematical structuralism are very different theories pertaining to very
differently behaved phenomenon – in no sense do I equate them. What I am equating is the common objection
they face; i.e., that the definition of an automorphism threatens to reduce to absurdity any view which takes the
identity criteria of certain individuals in their respective domains to be exhausted by their structural profiles.
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the existence of even one non-rigid system (e.g. S) is sufficient to reduce structuralism to
absurdity in virtue of their commitment to the identity of the digits of that particular non-
rigid system. In this sense, the shoe is verymuch on the other foot: whereas I do not require
all computational systems to be non-rigid to make my objection, pure structuralists must
require all computational systems to be rigid if they are to avoid my objection.
§6. To take stock, the reductio and its proof establish our two conjectures: that if pure
structuralists accept the indeterminacy of structural duals, then they are committed to
the indeterminacy of computational digits; and if they are committed to the indeterminacy
of computational duals they are provably committed to their identity, which is nonsense.
Therefore, it has been shown that pure structuralists cannot continue to bite the bullet when
it comes to the determinacy condition.
Not only does this provide a new kind of objection to pure computational structuralism,
but I take it to shed an important light on the determinacy condition itself. In fact, I think
it merits a complete reformulation of the condition. For, it is now clear that in order to
provide a determinate account of computing logic gates, we must be able to individuate
the fundamental computational digits, reducing the determinacy problem to the problem of
providing an adequate account of computational individuation.
As we have seen, satisfying this individuation condition will be most difficult for non-
semantic theories attempting to individuate the binary digits of structurally dual systems.
In particular, we saw that pure structuralism – which has only merge structural means by
which to individuate provably structurally identical digits – begins to look untenable. This
suggests that, contra pure structuralism, extra-structural resources are required to distin-
guish the digits, which brings us, finally, to hybrid accounts.
When it comes tomodern hybrid structuralist accounts of computation, the first thing to
realise is that the extra-structural resources of such accounts are not generally suitable for
mathematical precisification, unlike structure. Hybrid accounts import formally intractable
appeals to mechanisms and functions. As such, hybrid accounts are, for the most part, safe
from the formal proof of the reductio we provided for pure structuralists. Vitally, however,
it is incumbent on hybrid accounts to precisify the concepts they use to characterise compu-
tation – if not formally – to the extent that they can provide a criteria of individuation for the
computational digits. Otherwise, such accounts will be both immune to reductio proof and
impotent to satisfy the individuation condition simply because the concepts they import are
too vague. Therefore, hybrid accounts are still vulnerable to the reductio if their particular
account of individuation is not able to distinguish the computational digits, though this can
only be established non-mathematically and on a case-by-case basis.
Unfortunately, of all the adequacy conditions, comparatively little work has been carried
out on whether modern structuralist accounts can provide an adequate account of individ-
uation. The new understanding I have provided of the importance of this condition and
the disastrous consequences of failing to fulfil it will hopefully put this to right, but the
burden of proof here lies squarely with contemporary structuralists. Some notable excep-
tions include Dewhurst [2018] and Mollo [2018], therefore I want to finish by surveying
the prospects of their respective laudable proposals to provide an account of individuation
from non-structural non-semantic means.
§7. Dewhurst [2018]’s key insight is his distinction between two criteria of individuation
operating on computational systems: algorithmic equivalence and computational equiva-
lence. The former is grounded in logical equivalence and the latter in physical equivalence
such that the same logical function can be computed by distinct computational systems
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[Dewhurst, 2018, 110]. By this distinction, Dewhurst aims to supplement Piccinini’s mech-
anistic account of computation.14
On Dewhurst’s account the indeterminacy will remain because it maybe be indetermi-
nate which logical function a computational system is computing. However, with the use of
his distinction of he will avoid the reductio as follows; the definition of the automorphism
establishes neither the algorithmic equivalence of the digits nor their computational equiva-
lence. This is because the structurally identical digits will be kept algorithmically distinct
in virtue of their algorithmic equivalence being grounding in the distinctness of the logical
truth-values. Similarly, the digits will be kept computationally distinct in virtue of their
computational equivalence being grounded in two distinct physical states, e.g., 0–5v/>5v.
In this way, Dewhurst’s fix meets our new condition by tenuring out the individuation
of the computational digits to the identity criteria of the physical states. Unfortunately De-
whurst’s proposal globally undergenerates computational equivalences.15 In fact, the very
same mechanism which protects his account against my objection – i.e., grounding com-
putational identities in physical identities – also entails that, in practise, no two systems
are computationally identical due to their inevitable minuscule physical variations.16 The
problemhere is that it is nowunclear thatDewhurst is providing an account of computational
equivalence, given that we cannot capture cases where we want to say that the same com-
putation is being carried out by different physical systems. Therefore, Dewhurst’s account
does indeed satisfy the individuation condition, but only at the cost of another important
adequacy condition; the medium independence of computational explanation.
§8. Mollo [2018] and Miłkowski and Fresco [2019] have recently argued Dewhurst’s fix
can be itself fixed to recapture medium independence on a mechanistic account. This
is important because so far it looks like structuralists will be systemically unable to fulfil all
the desiderata of an adequate account of computation.
Mollo follows Dewhurst in drawing a distinction between algorithmic equivalence and
computational equivalence. However, he grounds the latter, not in physical structure, but in
“computationally-relevant” functional structure of a physical system [Mollo, 2018, 3495].
The functional structure, he says, is determined by a “teleological function”, e.g., the capac-
ity to “perform computations”. This means physically distinct systems can exhibit the same
functional structures if they share a target capacity. Hence, the medium independence of
computation is restored on Mollo’s account.17
To take Mollo’s own example, two devices, D1 and D2, with slightly different voltage
ranges (0-4/5-10V for D1 and 0-5/6-10V for D2) will have the same input-output tables
“when put in terms of equivalence classes”, as below:
14Piccinini’s own solution, that a device may implement a multiplicity of computations but that his understand-
ing of systemic functions alongwith the wider systemwill determine which function is relevant, will not avoid the
reductio. As we saw in §5 even one counterexample is enough and Piccinini cannot account for fully dual systems
interpretable in multiple ways. Also note that he accepts the indeterminacy which leaves him vulnerable to the
indeterminacy of the digits and their identification, even if in most cases the context of the system will determine
which is relevant.
15As pointed out by Miłkowski and Fresco [2019], but first pointed out by Dewhurst himself [Dewhurst, 2018,
110].
16This also means that, even within a system, there may be no equivalences between processors which perform
the very same algorithmic operation, e.g. AND.
17What I will argue about Mollo’s account applies equally to Miłkowski and Fresco.
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Table 3: Input–output table of D1 and D2’s functional equivalence classes
Although D1 and D2 are physically distinct, their computationally-relevant functional
profiles of their input-output equivalence classes are identical and hence they count as com-
putationally equivalent [Mollo, 2018, 3496]. Mollo thus provides a precisification of ‘func-
tion’ tractable enough to provide a criteria of individuation for logic-gates. The individua-
tion of D1/D2 is not governed by physical differences or even functional differences which
“play no role in their general computational capacities” [Mollo, 2018, 3496].
The two important questions we must ask of this account are: how does this criterion
apply to the individuation of the digits (in this case represented by equivalence classes);and
whether, so applied, it avoids our reductio.
According to Mollo the identity of the equivalence classes is defined by the uniform
sensitivity of the processing device with respect to its inputs and outputs [Mollo, 2018,
3494]. D1/D2 are sensitive to physically distinct voltage ranges but the functional profiles
of those voltage ranges are the same, as represented in Table 3. This is what justifies Mollo
in equivocating equivalence classes defined relative to physically distinct devices, like EC1
of D1 (0-4V) and EC1 of D2 (0-5V).
This means of satisfying the individuation conditionwill be vulnerable to the reductio if
the functional profiles of distinct equivalence classes can be shown to be identical. Again, we
cannot mathematically prove this as before because the definition of the automorphism es-
tablishes the digit’s pure structural algorithmic identity, not their functional-structural com-
putational identity. We must, rather, show that the same criterion of individuation Mollo
uses in Table 3, overgenerates to falsely equivocate EC1 and EC2.
Consider a fully dual/non-rigid system containing D1. Let EC1 = {0− 4V }, EC2 = {5-
− 10V } and let R be the equivalence relation by which Mollo equates EC1 of D1 and EC1
of D2 (Table 3). Then, R holds between EC1/EC2 iff EC1/EC2 have identical functional
profiles. To show EC1/EC2 have identical functional profiles, observe that EC1/EC2 can be
permuted without change to their functional profiles in D1 (table 4).





Table 4: Input–output table of D1’s functional equivalence classes after permutation
Thus, the functional profiles of EC1/EC2 are identical. Therefore, R holds between
EC1/EC2, which is false.
In other words, permuting EC1 and EC2 preserves their functional profiles because
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swapping them can have no effect on the uniform sensitivity of the processing devices with respect
to their inputs and outputs. Aswe have seen at length, the digits of a non-rigid system are per-
fectly symmetric. The equivalence classes are functionally as well as structurally symmetric
because any functional differences between EC1 and EC2 can play no role in their general com-
putational capacities. Hence the functional profiles of EC1 and EC2 are identical and since
computational individuation is wholly determined by the computationally-relevant func-
tional profiles of input-output equivalence classes, EC1 = EC2.
Note that we are permuting the equivalence classes themselves – i.e., the digits imple-
mented by the set voltage ranges – and not merely the names of the equivalence classes,
which are of course arbitrary. The problem here is not the indeterminacy of D1 which, as
Mollo points out, is to be expected on the mechanistic view. The problem is that if all we
have is the functional structure to appeal to, how can we say anything that will individuate
the functionally symmetric digits?
The basic thought here is that the same course-grained level of functional explanation
which allows for the identity of equivalence classes across different devices of different
mediums will also make Mollo unable to distinguish equivalence classes from the same
device, if those equivalence classes are functionally indiscernible, as the digits are.
To the pure structuralist we said that since the digits have, by mathematical proof, iden-
tical structural profiles and appeal to structure is the onlymeans they have of individuating
them, they are forced to identify the binary digits, which is absurd. To Mollo, we say that
since the EC’s have, by a simply permutation argument, identical functional profiles and
appeal to function is the only means he has of individuating them, he is forced to identify
the binary equivalence classes, which is absurd.
To avoid this absurdity, it seems that again the only means of recourse for the hybrid
structuralist is to retreat to Dewhurst’s original proposal of grounding computational in-
dividuation in the physical states. This would individuate EC1/EC2 since they are imple-
mented by distinct voltage ranges. As we saw this is to give up on the medium indepen-
dence condition which threatens the account with explanatory inadequacy. However, since
explanatory inadequacy is a far better problem that absurdity, and soMollo’s improvement
of Dewhurst fares far worst than Dewhurst’s original proposal.
This is no accident. Hopefully it has become clear that there is an inherent tension be-
tween the individuation condition and the medium independence condition (pointed out
by Mollo himself): the digits must be fine-grained enough not to be identified but course-
grained enough to cover computation across different mediums. The problem is that, as
with the mathematical case of -1/1 the digits are supposed to be just the symmetric im-
age of each other. This tension will temper all hybrid structuralists accounts and make us
pessimistic they can meet all the criteria of an adequate account of computation.
Therefore the burden of proof very much lies on the hybrid accounts to precisify their
appeals to functions and other resources enough to provide suitable individuation criteria.
Further, given the threat of a (non-provable) reductio, there is a new urgency to providing
this criterion.
§9. We have established several interesting results: that if computational functions are
indeterminate, computational digits are indeterminate; that the indeterminacy of the
computational digits implies their structural identity; that the latter result admits of math-
ematical proof; that this indiscernibility problem threatens structuralism with reduction to
absurdity; that computational andmathematical structuralists face the very same objection;
that global structuralism is not available to computational structuralists; and, most impor-
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tantly of all, that the stalemate in the debate is broken. Structuralists can no longer dig their
heels inwhen it comes to functional indeterminacyworrieswithout providing some answer
to this potentially fatal objection; some means of galvanising their account against absur-
dity. It remains to be seen whether they can provide a non-ad hoc basis for the rejection
of the identity of indiscernibles – or make good on an amendment like Dewhurst’s – while
safeguarding the medium independence of computation. This important work can now be
carried out with the importance of computational individuation better understood.
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